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Brown v. Mississippi is one of the most famous cases decided by the Supreme 
Court, involving the most infamous police interrogation in American history.1  Three 
black sharecroppers were sentenced to hang for murder based on confessions 
extracted by lengthy periods of whipping and hanging—treatment one of their 
tormenters described as “not too much for a Negro.”2  The Court held that the 
defendants’ coerced confession was inadmissible—a decision Michael Klarman has 
described as the Supreme Court’s efforts in early twentieth century criminal 
procedure to ensure that courts in the Deep South fairly evaluated a defendant’s 
guilt, and didn’t maintain one system for white defendants and a less-protective one 
for black defendants.3  There is an extraordinary intuitive appeal to Professor 
Klarman’s explanation.  Brown, the Court’s case to review an interrogation by state 
officials, involved three potentially innocent African American men who were 
condemned to die based on evidence discovered through torture—torture inflicted 
by duly appointed law enforcement officers who had no shame in admitting their 
acts in open court.  
Something other than innocence and equal protection concerns, however, 
appear to animate Brown v. Mississippi.  The lower court’s indifference to state-
sanctioned violence in Brown was an outlier.4  The Mississippi Supreme Court had 
demonstrated considerable concern about interrogation practices used against 
African Americans in the first quarter of the twentieth century,5 while tortured 
interrogations were neither uncommon nor limited to either the Deep South or to 
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1   See, e.g., J. MICHAEL MARTINEZ, THE GREATEST CRIMINAL CASES: CHANGING THE COURSE 
OF AMERICAN LAW 63–72 (Praeger 2014). 
2   Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 284 (1936). 
3   Michael J. Klarman, The Racial Origins of Modern Criminal Procedure, 99 MICH. L. REV. 
48, 49, 69, 77 (2000). 
4   This idea has been suggested previously.  See OTIS H. STEPHENS, JR., THE SUPREME COURT 
AND CONFESSIONS OF GUILT 37–38 (U. Tenn. Press 1973) (“The highest courts in various southern 
states [were not] altogether unwilling to condemn the use of such police methods against the Negro 
community.”); Wilfred J. Ritz, State Criminal Confessions Cases: Subsequent Developments in Cases 
Reversed by the U.S. Supreme Court and Some Current Problems, 19 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 202, 204 
(1962) (“It is also possible the Brown v. Mississippi case was something of a freak, a unique case of 
physical violence that slipped through the judicial screen.  Prior to the Brown decision, Mississippi had 
reversed convictions based on confessions obtained by physical violence.  Other states were following 
the same rule.”). 
5   See discussion at note 129 infra and accompanying text.   
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black suspects.6  Brown and the Supreme Court’s interrogation cases that followed 
were part of a new approach to criminal procedure: discouraging unacceptable police 
practices by denying the prosecution the opportunity to use evidence so derived.  We 
typically think of the Supreme Court first requiring the states to adopt the 
exclusionary rule in the 1961 case of Mapp v. Ohio.7  But the idea that evidence 
must be excluded to deter misconduct gained traction in state cases involving illegal 
searches in the 1920s during Prohibition, and was first imposed on the states by 
Brown v. Mississippi in 1936.   
In this essay, I argue that the sympathies the Brown decision evoked against the 
villains of the Old Confederacy provided the Supreme Court an ideal vehicle to 
reshape confessions law to mirror developments in search and seizure law.  Brown 
appears to have been driven by the single-minded deterrent concern that would come 
to define the Fourth Amendment’s exclusionary rule, even before the Court 
identified deterrence as a rationale for the exclusionary rule.  Perhaps not 
coincidentally, it did so at a time when police were increasingly using “third degree” 
tactics against black suspects.8  Brown, though, does not appear to have been driven 
by a concern that appellate courts, North or South, could not be trusted to fairly apply 
the standards relating to the admissibility of confessions.  Instead, the Supreme 
Court appears to have found the confessions rule, as it existed in the 1930s, to be 
insufficient to the task of preventing widespread torture in interrogation rooms, 
requiring the strong deterrent approach courts had taken to prevent unlawful 
physical searches.   
The history of the exclusionary rule—at least in federal court—is quite familiar.  
In Boyd v. United States, the Supreme Court in 1886 introduced to federal law the 
idea that illegally obtained evidence was inadmissible, solely because of the manner 
of the discovery of the evidence.9  The significance of Boyd itself is justifiably 
questioned.10  Versions of the exclusionary rule existed in state courts decades 
earlier11 and the rationale behind Boyd was almost immediately repudiated by the 
Court.  In finding that subpoenaed records were inadmissible in a forfeiture 
proceeding, the Court found that “the Fourth and Fifth Amendments run almost into 
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(describing nationwide problem of tortured confessions).  
7   See, e.g., Potter Stewart, The Road to Mapp v. Ohio and Beyond: The Origins, Development, 
and Future of the Exclusionary Rule in Search-and-Seizure Cases, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1365, 1372 
(1983). 
8   See Adler, supra note 6 at 4–6. 
9  Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886); TRACEY MACLIN, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE 
FOURTH AMENDMENT’S EXCLUSIONARY RULE 3 (Oxford U. Press 2013).  
10  See, e.g., Morgan Cloud, The Fourth Amendment During the Lochner Era: Privacy, 
Property, and Liberty in Constitutional Theory, 49 STAN. L. REV. 555, 578 (1996) (observing that the 
theory behind Boyd “probably strikes the contemporary reader as archaic, and perhaps wrong.”). 
11  See Roger Roots, The Originalist Case for the Fourth Amendment Exclusionary Rule, 45 
GONZ. L. REV. 1 (2009–2010). 
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each other,” that obtaining these physical documents was unreasonable because the 
holder of the records would be forced to incriminate himself.12  Within two decades, 
the Court had rejected the idea that turning over documents to federal investigators 
amounted to a Fourth Amendment violation, 13 but part of the Boyd opinion would 
be resurrected.  The Fourth and Fifth Amendments would again run into each other 
during Prohibition.  The regulation of confessions would, for the first time, be 
justified on the same grounds as regulating search and seizure, and that principle 
would be extended to the states. 
Seeing extraordinary backlash against searches for alcohol during National 
Prohibition, state courts became comfortable with an idea that had not previously 
resonated with them—that unlawfully obtained physical evidence should be 
excluded from criminal trials to deter subsequent police misconduct.  An early 
version of this evidentiary principle had gained traction in some state courts in the 
1850s, when many state legislatures introduced short-lived prohibitory laws.14  
National Prohibition in the 1920s, however, caused much greater consternation.  
Unlike in the 1850s, there were large police departments in the 1920s charged with 
the enforcement of liquor laws.15  Vigilante groups unknown in the 1850s—the Law 
and Order League and the Ku Klux Klan—were assisting in the effort.16  Excluding 
reliable evidence in criminal cases seemed then, as it seems to many now, 
antithetical to fact-finding mission of courts, but drastic times called for drastic 
measures.  Eighteen of the twenty-four states to adopt the exclusionary rule did so 
during Prohibition, with most of those states doing so during the first two years of 
the so-called “Noble Experiment.”17  
Deterring misconduct became an accepted basis of excluding physical evidence 
in state courts during Prohibition, as it had been in federal courts since Boyd, but 
state courts did not extend this principle to confessions.  In many ways, this is 
shocking.  State courts were willing to sacrifice reliable evidence to prevent 
unjustified searches for alcohol.  During this period, however, state courts did not 
view the deterrence of torture in interrogation rooms sufficient to justify the 
exclusion of evidence.  Surely the nature of evidence lost as a result of misconduct 
in an interrogation room would have been quite different than the nature of evidence 
lost to an unreasonable search.  Alcohol was the most frequent evidentiary product 
 
12  Boyd, 116 U.S. at 630. 
13  Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43 (1906); William J. Stuntz, Privacy’s Problem and the Law of 
Criminal Procedure, 93 MICH. L. REV. 1016, 1052 (1995). 
14  See Wesley M. Oliver, Portland, Prohibition, and Probable Cause, 23 MAINE BAR J. 210 
(2008).  
15  See, e.g., MIKE WALLACE, GREATER GOTHAM: A HISTORY OF NEW YORK FROM 1898 TO 1918 
(Oxford U. Press 2018); MICHAEL A. LERNER, DRY MANHATTAN: PROHIBITION IN NEW YORK CITY 61–
95 (First Harvard U. Press 2007).  
16  LISA MCGIRR, THE WAR ON ALCOHOL: PROHIBITION AND THE RISE OF THE AMERICAN STATE 
132–42 (W. W. Norton & Co. Inc. 2015).  
17  Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 224–32 (1960). 
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of a police search; police interrogations, by contrast, were used to close more serious 
crimes of homicide, robbery, arson, burglary, as well as bootlegging cases.18  But 
just as the societal costs of excluding evidence were higher for confessions, 
seemingly so would have been the benefits.  Commentators writing in the 1920s and 
1930s observed that third degree interrogation practices surpassed the scope and 
severity of any period of torture in Anglo-American history.19 
This is not to say that state courts were unconcerned about torture.  Taking their 
opinions at face value, Prohibition era judges were appalled at the practices that they 
were routinely seeing.  They sometimes called for the criminal prosecution of 
officers conducting the examinations.20  Early twentieth-century state judges, 
however, viewed reliability as the only basis for excluding confessions.  Torture, 
and practices far short of torture, certainly led these judges to conclude that 
confessions lacked sufficient reliability to be considered by a jury.21  When, 
however, a suspect identified physical items during the interrogation that 
corroborated his statements, or independently established his guilt, the physical 
evidence and often the statements themselves were admitted because they were 
reliable.  A reliable tortured confession, unlike unreasonably seized reliable physical 
evidence, would be admitted in state courts throughout the entire Prohibition era.22  
The ends sometimes justified the means in police work—an inconsistency in 
jurisprudence encouraging official violence that would not survive the Prohibition 
era. 
In the early years of Prohibition, however, the United States Supreme Court 
came to view unlawfully obtained physical evidence and confessions in the same 
manner.  In the all but forgotten opinion of Ziang Sung Wan v. United States, the 
Court cited Fourth Amendment precedents alone to exclude a statement obtained 
from a very ill man after a week of seemingly endless interrogation.23  State courts 
had been willing to adopt the Boyd and Weeks precedents for unlawfully obtained 
physical evidence, but only after the start of National Prohibition.24  Despite 
concerns about police torture in interrogation rooms that long pre-dated Prohibition, 
Ziang Sung Wan did not gain acceptance in state courts.   
 
18  Cf. WILLIAM J. STUNTZ, THE COLLAPSE OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 204–5 (2011). 
19  Charles T. McCormick, The Scope of Privileges in the Law of Evidence, 16 TEX. L. REV. 447, 
453–55 (1938). 
20  Baughman v. Commonwealth, 267 S.W. 231 (Ky. 1924).  The United States Supreme Court 
would similarly call for the prosecution of officers who engaged in a blatant pattern of illegal entries 
in the 1950s prior to Mapp v. Ohio.  See, e.g., Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128, 137–38 (1954).  
21  George E. Dix, Promises, Confessions, and Wayne LaFave’s Bright Line Rule Analysis, 1993 
U. ILL. L. REV. 207, 212–15. 
22  See McCormick, supra note 19 at 453–55. 
23  Ziang Sung Wan, 226 U.S. at 17, n.6. 
24  SARAH E. SEO, POLICING THE OPEN ROAD: HOW CARS TRANSFORMED AMERICAN FREEDOM 
121 (2019). 
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A long series of decisions, beginning with the landmark case of Brown v. 
Mississippi, would ultimately require the exclusion of coerced confessions 
regardless of their reliability.  In contrast to Ziang Sung Wan, the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Brown v. Mississippi is perhaps the second most readily identified 
confession case from the high tribunal.  Brown contained gruesome facts and a racial 
dimension that brought the case national attention, even prior to the Supreme Court 
agreeing to hear the case.  Its facts left a memorable historical marker in this first 
federal case to apply constitutional standards to a state confession.  Interestingly, the 
Fourth Amendment style of regulating state confessions foreshadowed in Brown 
pre-dated, by about thirty years, Mapp v. Ohio’s requirement that states exclude 
physical evidence obtained contrary to the Fourth Amendment.   
While Ziang Sung Wan and Brown are rightly seen as progressive, civil 
libertarian decisions addressing very serious police conduct, these decisions had 
seemingly unintended consequences.  The Fourth Amendment approach to 
confessions represented not just a different theoretical underpinning for federal 
oversight, this deterrence-focused scheme left to evidentiary codes any concern 
about false confessions.  Exclusion that was focused on concerns other than 
reliability allowed the Miranda warning-and-waiver scheme to dominate the 
assessment of a confession’s admissibility.25  The 1986 decision of Colorado v. 
Connelly then, with extraordinary clarity, demonstrated that constitutional standards 
would not prevent the admission even of a statement that utterly lacked reliability.26  
DNA exonerations have revealed that false confessions do occur, even in the absence 
of torture, and legal standards that fail to recognize this reality risk wrongful 
convictions.27  State and federal evidence codes that do consider the accuracy of 
confessions are quite liberal in allowing the admission of evidence that may bear on 
the guilt of the defendant, excluding it only when its probative value is “substantially 
outweighed” by reliability concerns.28    
Prohibition rightly brought courts’ attention to issues of police misconduct.  
Unfortunately, however, it fixated legal standards on misconduct.  Part One of this 
essay looks at how Prohibition, first in the 1850s, then in the 1920s, introduced 
deterring illegal searches as a goal of state criminal procedure.  Part Two then looks 
at how the United States Supreme Court required states, under the Due Process 
Clause, to apply this Fourth Amendment remedy in criminal cases to deter coerced 
confessions.  Finally, Part Three looks at how this shift from reliability to deterrence 
abandoned too much.  In its single-minded effort to deter torture and excessive 
 
25  Richard A. Leo, Miranda’s Irrelevance: Questioning the Relevance in the Twenty-First 
Century, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1000, 1027 (2000–01).  
26  479 U.S. 157. 
27  Steven Drizin & Richard A. Leo, The Problem of False Confessions in a Post-DNA World, 
82 N.C. L. REV. 891 (2004).  
28  See Fed. R. Evid. 403.  But cf. Richard A. Leo, et al., Promoting Accuracy in the Use of 
Confession Evidence: An Argument for Pretrial Reliability Assessments to Prevent Wrongful 
Convictions, 85 TEMP. L. REV. 759, 792–99 (2013) (arguing for a more searching analysis of reliability 
concerns under Rule 403).   
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coercion, the Court’s decisions would ultimately leave the issue of false confessions 
to rules of evidence that liberally favor admissibility.   
 
I. PROHIBITION’S DETERRENT MODEL FOR SEARCH AND SEIZURE 
 
While there were early fragments of the exclusionary rule before Prohibition, 
there can be no serious doubt that the rule survived and flourished because of 
Prohibition.  It was not until Prohibition that the rule was justified as a deterrent to 
police misconduct.29  During the 1920s, the rule then gained sufficient support 
among the states during Prohibition to lead the Court to conclude that it should be 
imposed on all the states in Mapp v. Ohio.  Use of evidentiary rules to control police 
investigatory tactics, first seen in Prohibition era Fourth Amendment cases, would 
come to define the constitutional regulation of interrogation in state and federal cases 
even before Mapp required all states to embrace it in search and seizure cases.  
In the Framing Era, there were occasional but rare examples of courts 
preventing cases from going forward because necessary evidence had been seized in 
an unreasonable manner.  During America’s first effort at Prohibition in the 
nineteenth century, this basis for thwarting a case became quite common.  In 1886 
and 1914, the United States Supreme Court held that the Fourth Amendment 
prevented unlawfully obtained evidence from being admitted in federal courts.30  
These decisions gave the exclusionary rule the form we recognize today, but these 
decisions alone would have been insufficient to transform the rules of evidence into 
our primary method of police oversight.  Given the influence the Supreme Court has 
over present-day state courts, it is somewhat remarkable to say that these decisions 
received almost no traction in the states.  It was only during America’s better-known 
effort at prohibition during the Jazz Age that state courts began to embrace the rule, 
leading the Supreme Court to ultimately require it in state court.31  Though courts 
did not always expressly state that the goal of excluding reliable evidence was 
deterring misconduct, commentators came to describe the new procedure in these 
terms.    
Some form of the exclusionary rule is as old as the country.  Framing era cases 
invoking a version of the exclusionary rule are quite uncommon, but far from non-
existent, as critics of the exclusionary rule often claim.32  Roger Roots has 
demonstrated that there were decisions in the late eighteenth century in which courts 
effectively took into account the manner in which evidence was obtained to conclude 
 
29  See Thomas E. Atkinson, Admissibility of Evidence Obtained Through Unreasonable 
Searches and Seizures, 25 COLUM. L. REV. 11 (1925); McCormick, supra note 19 at 455 (recognizing 
Atkinson’s article to be one of the first recognitions of a deterrent basis for the exclusionary rule).  See 
also Gore v. State, 218 P. 545 (Okla. Crim. App. 1923); State v. Johnson, 226 P. 245, 250 (Kan. 1924) 
(Harvey, J., dissenting).   
30  Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914).  
31  See SEO, supra note 24 at 121. 
32  See Roots, supra note 11 at 3. 
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that a case could not go forward.33  As Roots recognizes, the nature of judicial 
reporting, the rare use of physical evidence in criminal trials, and the lack of 
appellate rights for criminal defendants in the Framing Era necessarily means that 
there will be few surviving cases that relate to the modern exclusionary rule.  
Nevertheless, he observes that there are cases during this period dismissing 
proceedings against debtors and criminal defendants when the warrants summoning 
them to court are inadequate.34  A faulty arrest warrant would not conclude a 
criminal proceeding under modern law, but the fact that it did in the Framing Era is 
evidence that the principles underlying the modern exclusionary rule were in the 
mind of Framing Era lawyers.   
With the emergence of vice crimes, however, the exclusionary rule would 
emerge from the shadows.  It is not terribly well-known that there were two periods 
of Prohibition in American history.  The first was a product of state laws in the 1850s 
and, in most states, it lasted only a handful of years.35  The second period of 
Prohibition is much more familiar to us.  This version was a product of federal and 
state legislation, spanning from 1920 to 1933.36  The culture of enforcement was 
very different for each period for reasons largely relating to the rise of modern cities 
and police departments.  During the 1850s, in the absence of full-time police 
departments, private organizations were almost exclusively responsible for ferreting 
out illegal alcohol.37  By the 1920s, there was a fairly well-developed network of 
federal and state law enforcement officials, as well as societies claiming to preserve 
morals, that would be a part of the effort, with varying degrees of willingness.38  
Each period, however, saw courts exclude unlawfully seized alcohol as they 
witnessed societal backlash to the enforcement of Prohibition—and came to distrust 
the enforcers of Prohibition.   
In the 1850s, all of the states in the Midwest and Northeast, except 
Pennsylvania, enacted laws preventing the sale, transportation, and manufacture of 
alcohol for sale or transport.39  Though southern states were in the vanguard of the 
twentieth-century temperance movement, a link between the Prohibition and 
Abolition movements of the mid-nineteenth century squelched the anti-liquor 
 
33  Id. at 1–66.  
34  Id. at 22–26.  
35  See MICHAEL F. HOLT, THE RISE AND FALL OF THE AMERICAN WHIG PARTY: JACKSONIAN 
POLITICS AND THE ONSET OF THE CIVIL WAR 898 (Oxford U. Press 1999) (describing the Maine Law); 
FRANCES L. BYRNE, PROPHET OF PROHIBITION: NEAL DOW AND HIS CRUSADE (1961); JOHN A. KROUT, 
THE ORIGINS OF PROHIBITION 266 (1925).  
36  See generally DANIEL OKRENT, LAST CALL: THE RISE AND FALL OF PROHIBITION (Scribner 
2011).  
37  ROBERT L. HEMPEL, TEMPERANCE AND PROHIBITION IN MASSACHUSETTS, 1813–1852 (1982); 
BYRNE, supra note 35 at 39. 
38  McGirr, supra note 16.  
39  RONALD F. FORMISANO, FOR THE PEOPLE: AMERICAN POPULIST MOVEMENTS FROM THE 
REVOLUTION TO THE 1850S, 290 n.18 (Univ. N.C. Press 2008).  
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movement in the antebellum south.40  Enforcement of these largely short-lived laws 
depended on private actors, primarily Temperance Watchmen, who led the charge 
to get state legislators to enact laws that permitted ordinary citizens to obtain 
warrants to search for illegal alcohol possession.  The Watchmen were, with 
justification, viewed as zealots who might be over-eager to inspect the premises of 
their neighbors.41  The law that authorized them to search therefore required a 
statement of reasons supporting a belief that alcohol would be discovered.   
Judges began to view their role as guardians against illegal liquor searches.  
Magistrates on a number of occasions granted search warrants on the basis of 
complaints lacking a statement of support.42  Courts, much as they had in the handful 
of cases Roger Roots identified during the Framing Era,43 concluded that such 
proceeding began on an illegitimate basis and could not proceed.  Unlike in the 
Framing Era, however, state appellate courts existed in the 1850s.44  Published 
opinions therefore had occasion to “arrest the judgment of conviction” when trial 
courts had allowed convictions on the basis of evidence seized as a result of a 
complaint lacking the specificity required for liquor warrants.45  This version of the 
rule did not contain all of the provisions that we are familiar with today.  Courts 
would clarify that this remedy applied only to defects in the complaint, the 
equivalent of a modern-day affidavit in support of a search warrant, not to searches 
done without a warrant or illegally executed warrants.  State-level prohibition 
enforcement, however, transformed an infrequently recognized early version of the 
exclusionary rule into a fairly commonly-invoked limitation on prosecutions for 
improperly issued search warrants.      
Between the first and second period of Prohibition, the United States Supreme 
Court decided two cases that are alternatively, and falsely, cited as the first to hold 
that unlawfully obtained evidence is inadmissible in a criminal trial.  In Boyd v. 
United States, a forfeiture case, the Court concluded that the Fourth Amendment 
prevented the government from issuing a subpoena to require a company to turn over 
its records.  Boyd reasoned that the right to be free from unreasonable searches and 
seizures was informed by the right to be free from compelled self-incrimination.  
This ruling would have effectively prevented government entities from investigating 
potential criminal activity in businesses, absolutely thwarting the regulatory state—
 
40  Thomas H. Appleton, Jr., “Moral Suasion Has Its Day:” From Temperance to Prohibition 
in Antebellum Kentucky, in A MYTHIC LAND APART: REASSESSING SOUTHERNERS AND THEIR HISTORY 
19–42 (John David Smith & Thomas H. Appleton, Jr. eds., 1997). 
41  HEMPEL, supra note 37; BYRNE, supra note 35 at 39. 
42  State v. Staples, 37 Me. 228–29 (1854); State v. Spirituous Liquors, 39 Me. 262–63 (1855).   
43  Roots, supra note 11 at 22–26.  
44  See id. at 15. 
45  State v. Staples, 37 Me. 228 (1854); State v. Spirituous Liquors, 39 Me. 262 (1855); State v. 
Twenty-Five Packages of Liquor, 38 Vt. 387 (1866) (recognizing that forfeiture action could be 
quashed for failure to have a sufficiently particular search warrant); Fisher v. McGirr, 1 Gray 1 (Mass. 
1854) (action for value of seized liquor permitted on the basis of an insufficient search warrant); People 
v. Toynbee, 11 How. Pr. 289 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1855). 
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and, as a result, would not remain good law.46  The 1906 decision in Hale v. Henkle, 
holding that a custodian of records may be required to surrender documents in his 
possession when ordered to do so by subpoena, effectively reversed Boyd’s 
conclusion that the Fourth Amendment protected a defendant’s interest against self-
incrimination.47  Even though Hale later concluded that Boyd’s theory for the 
exclusion was invalid, Boyd is still regarded as the case that introduced the 
exclusionary rule to American law.48   
At the federal level, however, the rule would be resurrected prior to Prohibition.  
In 1914, the Court decided Weeks v. United States.  In Weeks, officers physically 
entered the defendant’s home, while in Boyd the government required documents to 
be turned over, arguably making Weeks the better case to be identified as 
establishing the federal exclusionary rule.  Government agents, suspecting that the 
defendant was transporting illegal lottery tickets, entered Weeks’ home without a 
warrant using a key they discovered he kept hidden outside the home.  Once inside, 
they discovered records they wished to use in the prosecution.  The modern method 
of preventing the use of this evidence in a criminal trial is obviously a suppression 
motion, something unknown to the law at the time of Weeks’ trial.  Instead, he filed 
a motion to return property which, if granted, would have put him in possession of 
the papers the government sought to use.  The Supreme Court found that the trial 
court had improperly denied his motion and reversed his conviction.49   
The Court’s rationale in Weeks would also appear unfamiliar to most present-
day lawyers.  We are accustomed to thinking of the exclusion of illegally obtained 
evidence being justified as a deterrent measure.50  If police know they will lose the 
fruits of their unlawful searches, they will not engage in them, the argument goes.  
The Weeks opinion spent a lot of time describing the rationale for protecting the 
freedom from unreasonable searches but offered essentially only one sentence in 
support of the remedy: “To sanction such proceedings would be to affirm by judicial 
decision a manifest neglect, if not an open defiance, of the prohibitions of the 
Constitution, intended for the protection of the people against such unauthorized 
action.”51  The motion to suppress and the deterrent rationale would not appear until 
National Prohibition as state courts quickly came to embrace the exclusionary rule.   
As bizarre as it may seem to twenty-first century lawyers, Boyd and Weeks held 
almost no persuasive sway over state courts.  In 1903, the Iowa Supreme Court 
 
46  Thomas Y. Davies, The Supreme Court Giveth and the Supreme Court Taketh Away: The 
Century of Fourth Amendment “Search and Seizure” Doctrine, 100 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 933, 
956–57 (2010).  
47  Stuntz, supra note 13 at 1052–54.  
48  See Stewart, supra note 7. 
49  Weeks v. United States, 235 U.S. 697 (1914).  
50  See, e.g., Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. 229, 237 (2011) (“Real deterrent value is a 
condition ‘necessary for exclusion’ but not a ‘sufficient’ one.”).   
51  Weeks, 232 U.S. at 394, 398–99.   
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adopted the Boyd decision, but reversed itself in 1924.52  No other state court or 
legislature would accept the exclusionary rule before National Prohibition.  The 
excesses of lawless enforcement, likely combined with resistance to even lawful 
enforcement, led state courts to embrace the rule, rather than the persuasive authority 
of Boyd and Weeks.  
The timing of state courts is very telling.  South Carolina was the first to flirt 
with the exclusionary rule after the Weeks decision, but did not cite the federal 
precedent when it did so.  While the federal version of Prohibition went into effect 
January 17, 1920, several states enacted their own versions that went into effect 
years earlier.53  South Carolina went dry in 1907.54  In 1916, the South Carolina 
Supreme Court in Town of Blacksburg v. Beam reversed the conviction of “a young, 
white farmer” who was subjected to an unlawful search on a train that revealed 
illegal alcohol.55  One year later, a defendant who claimed that he was the victim of 
an illegal search that revealed illegal lottery tickets argued that his conviction could 
not stand under either the South Carolina Beam precedent or the federal Weeks 
precedent.  The court found that “protection against officers not acting under claim 
of federal authority is not afforded by the guaranty of immunity from unreasonable 
searches and seizures under the Fourth Amendment of the federal Constitution.”56  
The Court further reasoned that Beam should be understood not as a mechanism to 
protect citizens from illegal searches and seizures but as a case recognizing the right 
to possess alcohol for personal consumption.57  The unique circumstances of liquor 
prohibition and enforcement, not a generic concern about privacy or autonomy—
and certainly not deference to federal courts—animated a narrowly cabined version 
of the rule in South Carolina.   
Most other state courts, to adopt the exclusionary rule, cited to the United States 
Supreme Court’s opinions in Boyd and Weeks as persuasive authority.58  Other than 
Iowa, however, none did so before a second round of Prohibition began.  Of the 
eighteen states to adopt the rule during this period, many were the states most heavily 
impacted by enforcement efforts—states with histories of brewing and distilling 
 
52  State v. Sheridan, 96 N.W. 730, 731 (Iowa 1903); State v. Rowley, 195 N.W. 881, 881 (Iowa 
1924). 
53  OKRENT, supra note 36 at 1, 66. 
54  JOHN EVANS EUBANKS, BEN TILLMAN'S BABY: THE DISPENSARY SYSTEM OF SOUTH CAROLINA 
1892–1915 172 (U. Mich. 1950). 
55  Town of Blacksburg v. Beam, 104 S.C. 146, 88 S.E. 441 (1916).  
56  State v. Harley, 92 S.E. 1034, 1035 (S.C. 1916).  
57  Id.  
58  See, e.g., SEO, supra note 24, at 121. 
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such as Kentucky, Missouri, and Tennessee;59 and states likely to be entry points for 
smuggled alcohol such as Michigan, Texas, and Washington.60   
These decisions were addressing concerns at the forefront of the nation’s public 
conversation.  The Wickersham Commission would observe in 1931 that 
“encouragement of bad methods of investigation and seizures on the part of badly 
chosen agents started a current of adverse opinion in many parts of the land.”61  
Front-page articles in newspapers read like mini-treatises on the Fourth Amendment 
while America’s first actual treatise on search and seizure law—a 925 page scholarly 
compilation that would rival any later entry into the field—was published in 1926 
by attorney Asher Cornelius in Detroit, ground-zero for Prohibition enforcement.62   
During Prohibition, courts for the first time began to expressly recognize that 
deterring illegal seizures was a goal of excluding unlawfully obtained evidence.  It 
is perhaps worth noting that this recognition came from state appellate courts rather 
than the United States Supreme Court, where scholars most often look to track the 
development of search and seizure doctrines.  A couple of examples, laden with 
rhetorical flourish, illustrate the point.  The Oklahoma Supreme Court in 1923 
concluded that: 
 
If . . . government agencies . . . are encouraged and condoned by the 
courts in their invasion of the privacy of homes, offices and places of 
business, forcibly and without invitation, for the purpose of procuring 
evidence to convict one of a misdemeanor, the practice followed to its 
logical conclusion will make our vaunted freedom a mere pretense, 
valueless, and without substance. Whenever the court actively encourages 
officers to procure evidence by force, the officers soon become dictatorial, 
arrogant, and even brutal—a natural consequence of the courts’ approval 
of obtaining evidence illegally by force.63   
 
Kansas Supreme Court Justice Harvey, dissenting in a case affirmed a 
conviction in a liquor prosecution in his court, took aim at early twentieth-century 
originalism in his call for a rule to deter illegal seizures: 
 
 
59  Youman v. Commonwealth, 224 S.W 860 (Ky. 1920); State v. Owens, 259 S.W. 100 (Mo. 
1924); Hughes v. States, 238 S.W. 588 (Tenn. 1922). 
60  People v. Marxhausen, 171 N.W. 557 (Mich. 1919); State v. Laundy, 204 P. 958 (Ore. 1922); 
State v. Gibbons, 203 P. 390 (Wash. 1922). 
61  NAT’L COMM’N ON LAW OBSERVANCE AND ENFORCEMENT, REPORT ON THE ENFORCEMENT OF 
THE PROHIBITION LAWS OF THE U.S., at 82 (Jan. 7, 1931).  
62  ASHER L. CORNELIUS, THE LAW OF SEARCH AND SEIZURE: BEING A PRESENTATION IN THE 
FORM OF BRIEFS WHICH COVER ALL OF THE VARIOUS PHASES OF THE SUBJECT, TOGETHER WITH 
PERTINENT FORMS (Bobbs-Merrill 1930).  
63  Gore v. State, 218 P. 545, 550 (Okla. Crim. App. 1923).  
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The early authorities in this country without much discussion of the matter, 
and some later state decisions, hold that the rule of evidence should be 
followed, and that one who was deprived of his constitutional rights must 
seek redress by an action against the officer for damages.  It is now 
generally recognized that the only effective way of securing the 
constitutional rights of the party in such a case is to prohibit the use of 
such evidence by prosecuting officers.64   
  
Law review articles during Prohibition also began to describe the utilitarian 
basis for the rule for the first time.  In 1923, a comment in the Yale Law Journal 
observed that “[m]any difficult problems have arisen in connection with the 
Eighteenth Amendment . . . not the least of these is that of enforcing it in a 
constitutional manner.”  At this point, the term “exclusionary rule” had not become 
the accepted nomenclature, so the article observed that federal courts “return[] upon 
demand property illegally obtained.”  The comment observed that in the absence of 
this remedy, civil actions against officers for trespass prevented the illegal search 
but that there was a “well known inadequacy” of tort law to prevent illegal 
searches.65   
The Supreme Court would not expressly describe the exclusionary rule as a 
deterrent until Wolf v. Colorado, sixteen years after Prohibition.66  Certainly the 
Supreme Court read a deterrent goal back into its earliest exclusionary rule 
decisions, but deterrence as a justification appears to have been first offered in state 
decisions adopting the federal exclusionary rule during Prohibition.  This 
Prohibition Era deterrent justification for the exclusionary rule would come to define 
the law of confessions. 
 
II. ADAPTING THE DETERRENT MODEL FOR INTERROGATIONS 
 
In the early days of Prohibition, while the debate was raging about whether the 
criminal justice system ought to sacrifice reliable-but-unlawfully-obtained physical 
evidence to deter subsequent violations, routine use of torture in interrogation rooms 
was increasingly becoming a public concern.  The confessions rule, later known as 
the “voluntariness test” under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, had 
since the birth of the American Republic excluded statements that were the product 
of “the threat of fear or flattery of hope.”67  The rule was based on fears that a coerced 
confession would be unreliable.  Fears of tortured interrogations were not at the 
 
64  State v. Johnson, 226 P. 245, 250 (Kan. 1924) (Harvey, J., dissenting).  
65  Comment, Legal Search and Arrest Under the Eighteenth Amendment, 32 YALE L. J. 490, 
490–91 (1923).  
66  338 U.S. 25, 31 (1949); Robert M. Bloom & David H. Fertin, “A More Majestic 
Conception”: The Importance of Judicial Integrity in Preserving the Exclusionary Rule, 13 U. PA. J. 
CONST. L. 47, 53 (2010) 
67  The King v. Warickshall (1783) 168 Eng. Rep. 234, 235.  
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forefront in the minds of eighteenth-century judges.  Police officers, to the extent 
they existed in the eighteenth century, generally did not question suspects at all.68  
They only began to routinely do so in the second half of the nineteenth century.69  A 
rule designed to prevent the admissibility of untrustworthy statements therefore 
adequately served the interest of a society prior to the creation of modern police 
forces.  With the rise of routine interrogations, however, this legal standard was 
inadequate to prevent torture from becoming routine in interrogation rooms.70  A 
new version of the confessions rule, based on the Fourth Amendment’s deterrent 
model, gained acceptance over the Prohibition era.   
Practically speaking, whether reliability or deterrence provides the theoretical 
underpinning for a confessions rule matters only for a particular type of evidentiary 
concern.  If false confessions alone are the law’s concern, then physical evidence 
discovered as a result of an improper interrogation should be admissible, perhaps 
even the confession itself if corroborated by reliable evidence.  If deterrence of 
inappropriate interrogation techniques is the law’s concern, then admitting the 
physical fruits of a coerced, or even tortured confession creates an incentive to obtain 
an accurate confession by any means necessary.  The choice between a deterrent and 
reliability basis for the confessions rule is, of course, a separate issue from how much 
judges will tolerate coercive interrogation tactics.  In fact, historically the same 
courts willing to admit corroborated tortured confessions would quite readily 
exclude uncorroborated ones on the basis of scant inducements.71  The rarity of 
police interrogations meant that law enforcement lost few confessions from rules 
quick to find that an interrogator’s tactic risked a false statement.  By the same token, 
deterring even torture in non-judicial interrogations was not a pressing concern in a 
world in which interrogations outside the judicial process were themselves 
extremely rare. 
The earliest judicial opinion on the admissibility of confessions to be cited by 
American courts was The King v. Warickshall, decided by the King’s Bench in 1783.  
We learn in the opinion that Jane Warickshall confessed to a theft, but we know 
nothing of the details about what was said to or done to her during the process of the 
interrogation.  The court nevertheless concluded that because she had been given 
“promises of favor” her confession came “in so questionable a shape when it [was] 
to be considered as evidence of guilt, that no credit ought to be given to it . . . .”72  It 
was the risk of false confession, not the need to send a message to future 
 
68  See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 53 (2004) (recognizing that magistrates rather 
than police officers conducted interrogations of suspects at common law).   
69  See Bruce P. Smith, Miranda's Paradoxical Prehistory 13 (2005) (unpublished manuscript) 
(on file with author) (observing how little is known about origins of police interrogation). 
70  Richard A. Leo, The Third Degree and the Origins of Psychological Police Interrogation in 
the United States, in 20 PERSPECTIVES IN LAW AND PSYCHOLOGY: INTERROGATIONS, CONFESSIONS, AND 
ENTRAPMENT 37 (G. Daniel Lassiter ed., 2004). 
71  See Jackson v. Commonwealth, 81 S.E. 192 (Va. 1914).  
72  Warickshall, 168 Eng. Rep. at 235. 
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interrogators, the court instructed, that required her statement to be disregarded.  Ms. 
Warickshall had, however, told her interrogators that the stolen item could be found 
in her bed, where they did, in fact, find it.73  As the reliability of the discovered 
item—and its evidentiary value—were not in dispute, the fears of falsehood in the 
confession created by whatever promise was extended to her did not apply to 
physical evidence revealed by her statement. 
Subsequent decisions from the United States Supreme Court accepted 
Warickshall’s reliability rationale for the regulation of interrogation practices until 
the turn of the twentieth century.  Hopt v. Utah reasoned in 1884 that 
 
voluntary confession of guilt is among the most effectual proofs in the 
law . . . .  But the presumption upon which weight is given to such 
evidence, namely, that one who is innocent will not imperil his safety or 
prejudice his interests by an untrue statement, ceases when the confession 
appears to have been made either in consequence of inducements of a 
temporal nature . . . or because of a threat or promise . . . depriv[ing] him 
of that freedom of will or self-control essential to make his confession 
voluntary within the meaning of the law.74   
 
State courts throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries would 
similarly regard reliability to underpin the regulation of confessions.  With two rare 
exceptions—the only two discovered after extensive searching of confessions cases 
of the period—state courts did not find deterrence of coercion or even torture to be 
a basis for rejecting a confession, so long as its reliability could be demonstrated.  
Much as in Warickshall, nineteenth-century courts held that physical evidence 
discovered as a result of a confession was admissible because its reliability was 
beyond dispute, and noted that the coerced confession would often also be admitted 
if its reliability was corroborated by the discovery.   
There were, however, two exceptional cases in this period that invoked 
deterrence, rather than just reliability, as a basis for excluding confessions.  The first, 
Jordan v. State, involved a runaway slave in Mississippi who was accused of killing 
another slave who attempted to thwart his flight to freedom.  Interrogators struck the 
defendant in the face with a stick while another threatened him with a pistol cocked 
at his face.  The Mississippi Supreme Court concluded in 1856 that the “rule which 
protects [a suspect] against a full confession of guilt, if it appeared that the 
confession had been extorted by violence, also protects him against testimony which 
could only be discovered, or made available through the instrumentality of such 
confession . . . .”75  Corroborating physical evidence was therefore inadmissible in 
this outlier case, despite its reliability, because of the violent means used to obtain 
it. 
 
73  Id.  
74  Hopt v. Utah, 110 U.S. 574, 585–86 (1884).  
75  Jordan v. State, 32 Miss. 382, 386 (1856).  
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In the second case, Rusher v. State, the Supreme Court of Georgia in 1894 made 
what appears to be the earliest, and clearest, expression of a rule of evidence 
designed to deter misconduct in the investigation of crime, but it created a rule that 
deterred a very narrow category of misconduct.  Private citizens had seized a suspect 
and asked him to identify the location of stolen money.  At trial, a lawyer said to one 
of the interrogators during the trial, “You gentlemen had used some coercion on him, 
hadn’t you?” to which the witness responded, “I suppose you might call it that.”76  
As in Warickshall, the Georgia court concluded that physical evidence was regarded 
as admissible, and going further, so too were “acts and declarations of the 
accused . . . in so far as they explain are necessary to account for it.”77  Reliability 
had its limits, however.  Far ahead of its time, the court reasoned that the “law ought 
to hold out no encouragement to violent and lawless men to commit crime for the 
sake of detecting a previous crime and bringing the offender to punishment.”78  
Almost poetically, the court offered, “[t]he law should never suffer itself to become 
an enemy or antagonist to its own reign.”79  This seemingly universal maxim, for 
the late nineteenth-century Georgia court, had substantial limits.  “Fruits of physical 
torture,” such as whipping would be excluded, but not reliable pieces of evidence 
discovered from interrogations that caused only “mere fear.”80  The defendant in 
Rusher did not, however, benefit from the rule in the case as the factual record made 
it unclear whether physical abuse occurred and the court said it would always 
presume no violence absent it being clearly established in the transcript.  The rule of 
law announced in this case was essentially dicta that would not be embraced by 
courts until Brown v. Mississippi.   
While physical force did not itself render a statement inadmissible, accuracy 
concerns—prompted by improper actions far short of physical force—were taken 
very seriously in state courts in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century.  As 
the Georgia Supreme Court stated, “coercion, however mild” was sufficient to cast 
doubt on a statement’s accuracy.  From a twenty-first century lens, these courts were 
far more willing to exclude statements infected by concerns of falsehood than we 
might expect.  A Virginia court in 1914, for instance, excluded a vague confession 
because a private citizen, who befriended a murder suspect, conversed with him over 
the course of few days, provided him food and tobacco, and confirmed the suspect’s 
belief that a suspect in a different case was spared the electric chair after he pled 
guilty.81  Countless cases were reversed because an interrogator merely said that it 
would be “better” for the suspect to confess.82   
 
76  Rusher v. State, 21 S.E. 593, 594 (Ga. 1894). 
77  Id.  
78  Id.  
79  Id.  
80  Id.   
81  Jackson v. Commonwealth, 81 S.E. at 193–94. 
82  See People v. Heide, 135 N.E. 77, 79 (Ill. 1922) (observing numerous states have recognized 
that telling a suspect that it would be better for him to confess renders a confession involuntary); see 
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This focus on accuracy, however, not only made the torture exceptions to 
Warickshall’s admissibility of physical fruits of a confession quite rare, it also 
ensured that the exceptions would not survive.  No state other than Mississippi or 
Georgia appears to have even considered such an exception.  This is not to say 
necessarily that state courts were unconcerned about the horrific acts that were 
occurring in the secret chambers of police stations in the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth century.  Taking these judges at their word, they appear to have been quite 
disturbed by interrogation practices that were emerging.  The exclusion of reliable 
evidence to address this concern was, however, quite a novel concept that state 
judges did not latch onto, even after they came to embrace this mechanism to curb 
illegal searches for liquor. 
Some cases involving multiple defendants vividly revealed that the same 
improper interrogation technique—used against multiple suspects—could yield very 
different results depending on whether the improperly obtained confession was 
corroborated.  In one such case,  the Tennessee Supreme Court, appointed by the 
military governor in 1865,83 had great sympathy for “free men of color” who were 
questioned by a posse of white citizens about a theft.84  One of the members of the 
posse told the freedmen that he would bail out anyone who identified the location of 
missing money, threatening that if there was no confession, all of the suspects would 
“go to the penitentiary, and probably be hung.”85  These men, the court described, 
“amidst the convulsive throes of one of the most terrible civil wars which the world 
has ever witnessed, had but recently been released from the yoke of bondage.”86  The 
court’s analysis of the legal concerns about the confessions, however, were stated in 
 
also, People v. Phillips, 42 N.Y. 200 (1870); Flagg v. People, 40 Mich. 706 (1879); Earp v. State, 55 
Ga. 136 (1875); Couley v. State, 12 Mo. 462 (1849); Biscoe v. State, 8 A. 571 (Md. 1887).  The Illinois 
Supreme Court reversed its conclusion in Heide one year later, citing cases holding that a statement 
that it would be “better” to tell the truth is insufficient, by itself, to render a confession involuntary.  
People v. Klyczek, 138 N.E. 275 (Ill. 1923).  See also Huffman v. State, 30 So. 394 (Ala. 1901); Hardy 
v. State, 3 App. D.C. 35 (1893); State v. Kornstett, 61 P. 805 (Kan. 1900); State v. Stanley, 14 Minn. 
105 (1869); Hintz v. State, 104 N.W. 110 (Wis. 1888); Commonwealth v. Hudson, 70 N.E. 436 (Mass. 
1904).  One month before the Illinois Supreme Court reversed itself on this issue, the Seventh Circuit 
had found that a statement that it would be “better” for the defendant to confess would not alone 
“disqualify the confession made pursuant thereto.”  Murphy v. United States, 285 F. 801 (7th Cir. 
1923).  See also discussion at n.92 & 112, infra.  As Klyczek recognized, a line of English decisions 
had recognized that an officer’s statement that it would be better for him to confess would be an 
improper inducement, rendering the subsequent confession inadmissible.  Klyczek, 138 N.E. at 154 
(citing Regina v. Laugher (1846), 2 Car. & K. 225; Regina v. Hatts (1883), 49 L.T. (N.S.) 780; Regina 
v. Griffin (1809), Russ. & R.C.C. 151; Regina v. Cheverton (1862), 2 Fost. & F. 833).  Klyczek also 
observed that a Canadian case had recognized that the phrase, “you had better” had taken on a technical 
meaning in the eyes of courts and had been absolutely prohibited as part of the interrogation.  Klyczek, 
138 N.E. at 154 (citing Regina v. Jarvis (1867), L.R. 1 C.C.R. 96.  See also infra note 92. 
83  See, e.g., R. Ben Brown, The Tennessee Supreme Court During Reconstruction and 
Redemption, in A HISTORY OF THE TENNESSEE SUPREME COURT 100 (James W. Ely, Jr. ed., 2002).   
84  McGlothin v. State, 42 Tenn. 223, 224 (1865).  
85  Id. at 226.  
86  Id. at 229.  
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a way that was not unique to the plight of these new citizens toward whom it clearly 
had particular sympathy.   
 
Evidence of confessions is liable to thousand abuses.  They are generally 
made by persons under arrest, in great agitation and distress, when every 
ray of hope is eagerly caught at, and frequently under the delusion, though 
not expressed, that the merits of a disclosure will be productive of personal 
safety—in want of advisers, deserted by the world, in chains and 
degradation, their spirits sunk, fear predominant, hope fluttering around, 
purposes and views momentarily changing, a thousand plans alternating, 
a soul tortured with anguish, and difficulties gathering into a multitude.  
How uncertain must be the things which are uttered in such a storm of 
passion.87 
 
While the Tennessee court refused to allow the uncorroborated confessions of 
the defendants in this case to be admitted, the suspect who identified the location of 
stolen coins did not fare so well.  The accuracy of his statement no longer in doubt, 
the coins were admissible even though they were found as a result of his confession.  
This decision was from a court that has been described by even a modern-day 
historian as a “radical court protecting Unionists and freedmen from Conservative 
Rebel sympathizers” to the point that precedent was often completely ignored.88  The 
willingness of the Tennessee Supreme Court to admit the reliable physical evidence 
extracted by fear by a posse reveals how strongly nineteenth-century courts viewed 
their role to be ensuring accurate confessions, not deterring future misconduct.  The 
risks of coerced interrogations the newly freed person faced surely would have 
seemed very plausible to this court in particular.  The Ku Klux Klan was founded in 
Pulaski, Tennessee, three weeks after the decision.89  If any court had an incentive 
to modify the confessions rule so that it would be a deterrent to abuses it feared, it 
would have been the federally appointed Reconstruction Era Supreme Court of 
Tennessee. 
The tension between judicial concern about torture and the inability of the 
confessions rule to address this concern continued into the twentieth century.  A 
1924 decision from the Kentucky Supreme Court reveals both contempt for the third 
degree and an implicit encouragement for interrogators to continue their brutality.  
Officers were interrogating “a colored boy between 16 and 17 years of age,” who 
was “shown not to possess the strongest intellect for one of his age” for a homicide.  
One of the officers conducting the investigation subjected the suspect to “very brutal 
treatment,” which the court never specifically described, but lead the court to 
conclude that “the maximum punishment applicable to that conduct should be meted 
 
87  Id.  
88  Brown, supra note 83, at 101–02. 
89  ELAINE FRANZ PARSONS, KU-KLUX: THE BIRTH OF THE KLAN DURING RECONSTRUCTION (U. 
N.C. Press 2015). 
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out to that officer.”  The young defendant, however, not only confessed to the crime 
but lead the officers to the murder weapon.  This reliable evidence supported the 
conviction.  In order to reverse this conviction, the court observed that it would have 
to reverse the longstanding Warickshall rule that allowed the physical fruits of any 
confession to be admitted. 
It would be easy enough to conclude that any particular court was merely 
paying lip service to its concerns about tortured interrogations, but they were 
certainly excluding confessions when corroborating evidence did not appear.  The 
Oklahoma Supreme Court for instance excluded a confession in 1928 where officers 
threatened to have “two young boys” killed if they did not confess to having stolen 
a car.  The Court offered this stinging rebuke of techniques with which it had come 
to be all too familiar:  
 
We take this occasion to condemn such practices in unmeasured terms.  
We are not living in the dark ages in a time when the defendant had no 
rights which anybody was bound to respect, but we are living in an 
enlightened and modern age where the defendant is presumed to be 
innocent until he is proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt and where he 
is entitled to be confronted by his accusers and to meet a charge in writing 
duly verified and to give bail and to be represented by counsel.  All of 
these constitutional rights were denied the defendants in the car at bar and 
by means of threats and intimidation the purported confessions were 
obtained from these young boys.  The state of Oklahoma does not sanction 
such methods of obtaining evidence.  County attorneys should refuse to 
prosecute cases where the evidence was obtained in such a manner.90 
 
The United States Supreme Court, by contrast, was beginning to shape a 
confession doctrine that detached questions of admissibility from reliability.  The 
Court in 1897 reversed the conviction of a suspect whose interrogator told him that 
if he committed the crime with another, he should admit it and “not have the blame 
of this horrible crime on [his] shoulders.”91  While finding even the most minor 
 
90  Ross v. State, 289 P. 358, 359 (Okla. Crim. App. 1930). 
91  The Supreme Court found this confession inadmissible because the interrogator told the 
suspect it would be better for him to confess, a very common basis for finding a confession involuntary 
in the nineteenth century.  A Canadian court had observed that language that it “would be better” in an 
interrogation had a technical meaning that would render a confession inadmissible.  Regina v. Jarvis 
(1867), L.R. 1 C.C.R. 96.  A Canadian decision with this degree of clarity may have been particularly 
significant since the interrogation at issue in Bram occurred in Halifax, Nova Scotia.  A very interesting 
fact in this case is that the suspect was being stripped as the interrogator told him it would be better to 
confess.  This is often overlooked because the court does not address this fact in its legal analysis.  The 
United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in 1923 rejected the long-held view that a 
statement that it would be “better” for the defendant to confess would, regardless of any other 
circumstances, render the subsequent confession inadmissible.  The Seventh Circuit quite wisely 
observed that Bram faced a very real threat as his interrogators began to disrobe him—he would have 
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inducements, or suggestions of leniency, to render a confession inadmissible was 
not terribly unusual in the late nineteenth or early twentieth century,92 the basis for 
doing so in Bram v. United States was new.  While the Court’s previous decisions 
had emphasized that the admissibility of a confession turned on its trustworthiness, 
accuracy was not even offered as a factor to be considered in Bram.  The 
admissibility of a confession, the Court ruled, was “controlled by that portion of the 
Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, commanding that no 
person ‘shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.’”93  
Interestingly, a decade earlier the Court had used the self-incrimination clause to 
justify the exclusion of reliable evidence in Boyd v. United States.  In Bram, the 
Court extended the reach of the self-incrimination doctrine to extra-judicial 
confessions just as Boyd had allowed it to expand search and seizure principles. 
Using the self-incrimination clause to inform the admissibility of statements 
outside the judicial process was inconsistent with the history of this principle, but 
one can imagine the Court finding a connection between these ideas.94  The privilege 
against self-incrimination, however, historically dealt only with statements made in 
court under oath.95  Courts have occasions to consider two types of statements from 
criminal defendants—those made in judicial proceedings and those given out of 
court, such as in an interrogation.  As statements given in an official proceeding 
required an oath, a doctrine emerged preventing a defendant from having to make 
the painful choice between incriminating himself and facing, for almost every crime 
before the nineteenth century, the death penalty; or falsely exculpating himself under 
oath, saving his earthly body but damning his immortal soul.96  If the defendant 
simply refused to answer a question that would require him to incriminate himself, 
he could be held in contempt of court, which could lead to earthly torture.97  Arthur 
 
reasonably believed he was about to be flogged—and this was the appropriate basis for finding his 
confession involuntary.  Murphy v. United States, 285 F. 801, 812–13 (7th Cir. 1923). 
92  See, e.g., People v. Foster, 179 N.W. 295 (1920); Casenote, Evidence-Confessions-
Admissibility When Elicited by Advice to Tell the Truth, 30 YALE L. J. 418.  In 1922, Zechariah Chafee 
called for courts to more frequently exclude interrogations when police engage in coercive conduct, 
but also exhorted courts to less frequently find that confessions absent coercion were inadmissible 
because officers muttered a taboo thought.  Zechariah Chafee, The Progress of the Law, 1919–1920, 
Evidence II, 35 HARV. L. REV. 428, 435 (1922) (“Although greater severity toward this practice is 
needed, signs of fewer technical exclusions of confessions are also welcome, e.g., the admission of a 
confession elicited by advice to tell the truth.”).  See also citations in note 82, supra. 
93  Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 542 (1897). 
94  As Charles McCormick would observe of the Bram case in 1938, conflating the confessions 
rule and the self-incrimination doctrine “is an historical blunder,” but as McCormick further noted, 
“the kinship of the two rules is too apparent for denial.  McCormick, supra note 19, at 453.  In fact, the 
Supreme Court would consider the privilege against self-incrimination as contributing to its decision 
in Miranda v. Arizona. 
95  Albert W. Alschuler, A Peculiar Privilege in Historical Perspective: The Right to Remain 
Silent, 94 MICH. L. REV. 2625 (1995).  
96  Id. at 2638. 
97  Id.   
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Miller’s play, The Crucible, depicting the Salem witch trials famously described 
stones being placed on Giles Corey to break his silence until he was ultimately 
pressed to death.  The cruel trilemma of perjury, self-incrimination, or contempt had 
not been extended to statements taken outside the judicial process because they were 
not under oath.  Historical protections against self-incrimination ensured that a 
defendant could not be required to testify in judicial proceedings.  In Bram, decided 
a decade after the Court in Boyd concluded that the Fourth Amendment should be 
regarded as protecting an interest analogous to the Fifth Amendment’s self-
incrimination clause, the Court concluded that that a defendant enjoyed the privilege 
against self-incrimination in an interrogation room. 
What was meant by Bram was not entirely clear.  Neither the voluntariness 
standard from the Supreme Court’s earlier decisions, nor the development of the 
doctrine in the states provided a basis for predicting when a confession was 
admissible,98 but prior to Bram it was clear why a confession was admissible.  If a 
court concluded there were reasons to suspect the confession was false, it would be 
excluded.  It was not clear how Bram would change that if the Court would 
subsequently exclude statements of unquestionable accuracy when the facts 
suggested that the suspect would not have confessed absent coercive pressure.  The 
facts of the Bram case did not require the Supreme Court to opine on this question.  
Understandably, the Supreme Court may have wanted to wade into such a radically 
different way of approaching confessions in a subtle way and Bram may have been 
a first step toward an approach that did not allow corroboration to rescue a coerced 
or tortured confession.  But of course this type of subtlety, if that is indeed what it 
was, lacked clarity and left lower courts to believe that reliability remained the basis 
for evaluating a confession. 
Decades later, in the early years of Prohibition, a decision from the District of 
Columbia Court of Appeals provided the Court an opportunity to craft a confessions 
rule to more clearly deter third degree practices.  Following the murder of three 
diplomats staying at the Chinese Educational Mission in Washington, a man who 
had recently stayed at the mission but returned to his New York apartment was 
escorted back to D.C. for what would be a week-long interrogation.  The suspect, 
Ziang Sung Wan, was then suffering from a very painful bout of colitis and, despite 
his suffering, was interrogated for hours on end, with the interrogation sometimes 
going well into the night, including visits to the crime scene.  His ordeal ended when 
he told his interrogators that he had killed one of the victims, but not the other two.  
After he had a chance to rest in a jail cell following the confession, he was asked to 
provide a written statement, but for the first time he was instructed that it was his 
right not provide it.  The defendant agreed and a stenographer was summoned to 
 
98  See Charles D. Weisselberg, Saving Miranda, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 109, 112 (1998) 
(observing that voluntariness test that preceded Miranda lacked clarity). 
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record questions detectives posed to him and his answers, leading to a twenty-four-
page document that he signed.99  
The D.C. Court of Appeals’ decision affirming Wan’s conviction was a 
statement of the strongest possible version of Warickshall.  Most courts admitted no 
more evidence of an involuntary confession than the King’s Bench had done in 1783, 
namely only the reliable evidence discovered as a result of the confession.100  Some 
courts, however, admitted the corroborated portions of the confession as well as the 
evidence resulting from the coerced statement.101  In Ziang Sung Wan, the Court of 
Appeals held that the suspect’s signed statement was not a confession at all, but “a 
mere fact or piece of competent evidence, upon which there was a conflict in the 
testimony, and which was properly submitted to the jury for its consideration.”102  
The allegedly coerced statement, reduced to writing and signed by the defendant, 
was for the D.C. Court of Appeals, analogous to a unique, missing spoon 
investigators found in Jane Warickshall’s bed following her interrogation.    
As for the spoken confession itself, the appellate court recognized that such 
statements had to be “free and voluntary; that is, must not be extracted by any sort 
of threats of violence, nor obtained by any direct or implied promises, however 
slight, nor by the exertion of any improper influence.”103  The court took the 
approach that state courts were then taking, and that the Supreme Court had taken 
prior to Bram, holding that “the crucial test to be applied is determining whether or 
not a confession is voluntarily or involuntarily made depends upon its truth or 
falsity.”  Quoting a Pennsylvania case from 1792 for a proposition conspicuously 
absent from the Bram opinion, the court observed that the “true point for 
consideration … is whether the prisoner has falsely declared himself guilty of a 
capital offence?”104  Remarkably, the Court therefore found the confession was 
voluntary because it was corroborated, not because the method of interrogation was 
within acceptable bounds.  As “[a]ll the circumstances in the case corroborate[d]” 
the confession, “its admissibility, as competent evidence for the consideration of the 
jury, is supported by every principle of law.”105 
As state courts had begun to expressly acknowledge in search and seizure cases, 
allowing illegally obtained evidence to be admitted provided an incentive for these 
tactics to continue.  Abuses in interrogation rooms began to captivate the nation’s 
attention around the turn of the century, contemporaneous with the Bram decision, 
perhaps explaining the Supreme Court’s experimentation with a new regulatory 
 
99  SCOTT D. SELIGMAN, THE THIRD DEGREE: THE TRIPLE MURDER THAT SHOOK WASHINGTON 
AND CHANGED AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 32–48 (2018).  
100 See, e.g., State v. Height, 91 N.W. 935, 935 (Iowa 1902).   
101 See, e.g., Baughman v. Commonwealth, 267 S.W. 231, 235 (Ky. 1924); State v. Vaigneur, 5 
Rich. 391, 403 (S.C. 1852).  
102 Ziang Sun Wan, 289 F.908, 913 (D.C. Cir. 1923).   
103 Id. at 913 (citing Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 542 (1897)). 
104 Id. at 914 (quoting Commonwealth v. Dillon, 1 L.Ed 765 (Pa. 1792)).   
105 Id.  
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scheme that did not depend on reliability.  If the Supreme Court was hoping lower 
courts would take steps to deter coerced confessions, the D.C. Court of Appeals did 
not get the message. 
There was certainly pressure for the Supreme Court to weigh in on this issue.  
By the turn of the century, newspapers had begun to report stories of physical torture 
in interrogation rooms and call for an end to the police tortures frequently called the 
“third degree.”106  State courts, despite their willingness to admit the corroborated 
fruits of torture, were frequently describing the horrors of the third degree.  
Legislatures passed laws that prohibited mistreatment in interrogation rooms, 
frequently called “anti-sweating statutes,” derived from a practice of leaving a 
suspect in an unbearably hot room.107  The United States Senate in 1911 conducted 
an investigation into the practice and the mistreatment became featured in popular 
culture.  A Broadway play entitled The Third Degree premiered in 1909, and was 
twice made into a movie in 1919 and 1926 depicting officers wringing a confession 
from an innocent man during a seven-hour ordeal.108 
The Supreme Court granted certiorari in Ziang Sung Wan and reversed.  When 
the case is considered in histories of criminal procedure, and it rarely is, it is offered 
for the proposition that “the requisite of voluntariness is not satisfied by establishing 
merely that the confession was not induced by a promise or threat.”109  The Supreme 
Court did find that the lower court had not properly understood the voluntariness 
standard.  Citing Bram, the Court held that “a confession obtained by compulsion 
must be excluded whatever may have been the character of the compulsion, and 
whether it was applied in a judicial proceeding or otherwise.”110  Trial courts no 
longer had to fit coercive tactics into the model of a threat or promise as the Court 
had done in Bram.111  Whatever coercion meant, it was broader than a threat or 
promise, providing a vehicle for courts to evaluate the conduct of interrogations. 
More importantly, however, the Court in Ziang Sung Wan rejected accuracy as 
a basis for admitting a coerced confession.  Corroborating evidence was not a 
consideration in the Court’s analysis, nor did the Court even acknowledge the lower 
court’s position—that the written confession was an admissible fruit of the 
interrogation, much like the stolen item discovered as a result of Ms. Warickshall’s 
confession.   
 
106 SELIGMAN, supra note 99, at 82–85. 
107 Charles T. McCormick, Some Problems and Developments in the Admission of Confessions, 
25 TEX. L. REV. 239, 254 (1946).  
108 SELIGMAN, supra note 99, at 85–87. 
109 Ziang Sung Wan, 266 U.S. 1, 3 (1924). 
110 Id. at 3. 
111 The Seventh Circuit concluded, one year before Bram, that it was not an implied threat of 
leniency that called Bram’s confession into question but the removal of his clothing, something seamen 
of the time would understand to be a prelude to a flogging.  Murphy v. United States, 285 F. 801, 803 
(7th Cir. 1923). 
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Perhaps most interestingly, Ziang Sung Wan was an unusual case because of 
the authority it cited.  Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule cases were offered for 
the proposition that this involuntary statement must be excluded.  The Court offered 
a string citation to every confessions case it had ever decided, offered to support the 
conclusion that the statement was involuntary, but the holding of the Court was that 
the “alleged oral statements and the written confession should have been 
excluded.”112  For this, the Court offered a string citation to every case it had ever 
decided on what we now know as the exclusionary rule.113   
Ziang Sung Wan was a terse, unemotional Brandeis decision, words that do not 
often appear in the same sentence.114  It was also a unanimous opinion that 
fundamentally restated the constitutional basis for excluding a confession with 
citations buried in a footnote.  In 1924, the Court had a body of law excluding the 
fruits of police misconduct that was unavailable when it decided Bram in 1897.  
Bram had, though, referenced the one exclusionary rule case in existence at that time 
(Boyd) in offering its description of the privilege against self-incrimination.  
Understandably, the Court would not have thought of the exclusion of illegally 
obtained evidence as a principle of law of general applicability in 1897.  By 1924, 
the principle that unlawfully obtained evidence was inadmissible in a criminal trial 
had quite a pedigree in federal and state courts.  Though, not surprisingly, only the 
federal decisions were included in this very brief opinion governed by federal law.  
It may seem surprising that the Court did take up the issue of coerced or tortured 
confessions earlier.  Despite frequent concerns being raised about third degree 
tactics, the Supreme Court would not have had many occasions to weigh in on the 
issue.  Almost without exception, if a prosecutor was attempting to introduce a 
confession in a criminal case, it was in a state prosecution.  Federal constitutional 
protections of criminal suspects were not, at this point, regarded to extend to the 
states.115  The few interrogation cases the Court had heard in the nineteenth century 
came from rare circumstances where federal courts had jurisdiction over criminal 
matters—in territorial Utah, in Indian country, and on the high seas.116  The criminal 
 
112 Ziang Sung Wan, 266 U.S. at 17. 
113 Id. at 17 n.6.; Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 631 (1886); Weeks v. United States, 232 
U.S. 383, 398, (1914); Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 392 (1919); Gouled v. 
United States, 255 U.S. 298 (1921); Amos v. United States, 255 U.S. 313, 316 (1921); Bilokumsky v. 
Tod, 263 U.S. 149, 155 (1923).  
114 Justice Holmes, who once noted that he often thought a little more than he said in a judicial 
opinion, read a draft of the Ziang Sung Wan opinion and praised it saying, “I suppose you are right not 
to show disgust or wrath—I don’t know whether I could have held [it] in.”  SELIGMAN, supra note 99, 
at 99–100 (2018).  The opinion very much had the feel of a Holmes opinion in its lack of elaboration 
of either facts or law. 
115 See Kenneth Katkin, “Incorporation” of the Criminal Procedure Amendments: A View from 
the States, 84 NEB. L. REV. 397 (2005) (observing that the process of incorporating criminal procedure 
provisions began in 1932).    
116 See Hopt v. Utah, 110 U.S. 574, 584 (1884) (from Utah territory); Sparf and Hansen v. United 
States, 156 U.S. 51, 55 (1895) (murder on the high seas); Pierce v. United States, 160 U.S. 355, 357 
(1896) (in Cherokee Nation); Wilson v. United States, 162 U.S. 613, 623 (1896) (in Indian territory); 
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courts of the District of Columbia were however, federal courts, and therefore 
subject to the oversight of the United States Supreme Court.  With national criticism 
of the third degree, it may be surprising that the Court did not identify a case suitable 
for calling out abusive interrogation practices from D.C. prior to Wan.  It must be 
remembered however, that this was a relatively small city in 1920, and before the 
recognition of a constitutional right to an attorney few potential legal issues were 
preserved in criminal trials or taken up on appeal.    
The nation’s concern about the third degree certainly did not end with the Wan 
decision.  Five years after the Wan decision, a presidential commission was 
appointed to consider why the administration of justice had fallen into disrepute.  
Though the commission had not been limited in its scope, there was a sense that this 
was a body primarily established to examine the enforcement of the hated liquor 
laws.  Instead, the Wickersham Commission expanded its work to consider almost 
every aspect of the criminal justice system with its most sensational work relating to 
the third degree.  Cataloging in one place abuses that were already known to courts, 
legislatures, and newspaper reporters brought national attention to the issue under 
the imprimatur of a presidential reform commission.117   
Against this backdrop, the Supreme Court took up the case of Brown v. 
Mississippi.  It is hard to imagine a worse image of the American criminal justice 
system on display, but the glimpse the case provides of Mississippi justice in the 
1930s is, in some ways, far from entirely accurate.  After suspicion for a farmer’s 
murder fell on three African American men, officers and private citizens took one 
of the suspects to a private location where they slowly suspended him in the air using 
a noose, lowering him to ask if he was willing to confess.  When he still refused, the 
poor man was again hoisted in the air by his neck and when he still refused to give 
his tormentor what they wanted, they whipped him until the party grew tired of the 
endeavor and released him.  Two days later, the same deputy again arrested the 
suspect, drove him to a remote location in neighboring Alabama and began to whip 
him, telling him that the whipping would continue until he confessed, which he 
ultimately did.  Meanwhile, the two other suspects were whipped in a similar manner 
in the county jail until they confessed.  Perhaps the most disturbing of all, when the 
case went to trial a week after the murder, one of the three defendants tried 
unsuccessfully to enter a guilty plea, being less afraid of a judicially authorized 
execution than further tortures.  The deputy sheriff who participated in the hanging 
and whipping made no effort to deny the abuse of the suspects and when asked at 
 
Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 558 (1896) (murder on the high seas); Hardy v. United States, 
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117 John D. Calder, Between Brain and State: Herbert C. Hoover, George C. Wickersham, and 
the Commission that Grounded Social Scientific Investigations of American Crime and Justice, 1929–
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trial if he thought the techniques used were excessive, he responded, “not too much 
for a Negro.”118 
Remarkably, the Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed the conviction and death 
sentences in Brown on a procedural technicality.119  The defense lawyers in many 
ways performed masterfully, convincing the defendants—at least one of whom 
preferred a quick death to the risks associated with a trial—that if they described the 
tortures inflicted upon them the law would protect them Mississippi law required 
the defendant to move to exclude a confession in the trial court after evidence had 
been introduced to support a claim that interrogators had used coercion.  The lawyers 
in Brown had made a motion to exclude the confessions but had done so before 
Deputy Dial's testimony and they did not renew the objection after his testimony.  
The tortures involved in Brown became something of a national human rights 
case.  Not only had the issue of the third degree generally come to the public’s 
attention through the Wickersham Commission and reporting on the Commission’s 
findings, but the Brown case itself became nationally known.  The case was covered 
by Time magazine and the New York Times.120  The case raised the possibility of the 
execution of innocent men who had been tortured into confessing in a state correctly 
perceived to have one of the worst civil rights records in the former Confederacy.  
In fact, Kemper County, Mississippi, where the defendants were tried, had seen more 
lynching than all but two counties in Mississippi.121  Understandably, scholars have 
concluded that Brown was a type of equal protection case—that federal courts used 
the case to establish a certain minimum threshold of fairness so that black citizens, 
particularly in the Old South, would not be subjected to a very different method of 
proof than white citizens.122 
It is undeniable that the facts of Brown are horrific, but sadly not as isolated as 
one would hope.  The Wickersham Commission revealed similar tortures throughout 
the country, perpetrated against suspects of all races.  In a Wisconsin case in 1922, 
for instance, the state’s high court reversed a conviction based on a confession by a 
white suspect that had been extracted by tortures leaving marks from which the 
defendant “must have suffered greatly,” according to a doctor who testified.  One of 
the officers participating in the interrogation was asked at trial if he had beaten the 
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suspect.  With language particularly mirroring Deputy Dial’s in the Brown case, he 
responded, “. . . what we ought to have done would be to kill him.”123  
Suspects of every race and region were at risk.  Brown v. Mississippi, citing the 
revelations in the Wickersham Commission, forbade state courts from admitting 
tortured confessions.  The scathing opinion did not expressly state the Court’s 
concerns were unrelated to the reliability of the statement obtained.  The Supreme 
Court’s omissions in the Brown opinion may have been as important as its express 
statements.  Anyone reading the record of the torture the suspects in Brown endured 
would naturally imagine that they would say anything necessary to end the ordeal.  
Reliability was the strongest argument against the admission of these confessions, 
yet reliability was not addressed in the first opinion of the Supreme Court overruling 
a state supreme court interrogation opinion.  As state confessions law was based on 
reliability concerns, however, these courts would leave untouched even tortured 
confessions when corroborated by reliable physical evidence.  Brown started the 
Supreme Court down a path toward ultimately requiring states to ignore reliability 
in deciding whether police conduct in the interrogation room prevented the 
admission of the subsequent confession.  
The surprisingly civil libertarian history of the Mississippi Supreme Court 
further reveals that Brown was a vehicle for creating a new type of confessions rule.  
The Supreme Court in 1936 had the ability to do only two things about 
interrogations: it could require states to use a different legal standard, and it could 
supervise the application of whatever legal standard due process required.  Certainly, 
the Brown decision did the latter and the facts of Brown would suggest that this was 
appropriate as state appellate courts could not be trusted.  The racial overtones of 
this case in one of the poorest counties in Mississippi, a county that had the dubious 
distinction of having seen more lynchings than any other county in America, would 
understandably seem to suggest that courts, especially in the Deep South, were 
turning a blind eye to the plight of African American men in the criminal justice 
system.124 
Appellate courts however, even in the Deep South, did not follow such easy 
stereotypes.  This is not to suggest that these courts were colorblind, in fact quite far 
from it.  The race of the defendant was apparent in their descriptions.  Prior to the 
Civil War, the title of the case indicated when the party was “a slave.”125  Well into 
the twentieth century, these courts would identify the defendant’s race in the facts, 
often sympathetically noting in interrogation cases that the suspect’s social status 
 
123 Lang v. State, 189 N.W. 558, 560 (Wis. 1922).  
124 Kemper County, Mississippi, had one of the most notorious records in America for racially-
motivated violence from Reconstruction into the twentieth century.  In 1875, a Republican sheriff and 
his family, as well as a large number of African Americans were indiscriminately killed by those who 
objected to the sheriff’s protection of black citizens.  JAMES M. WELLS, THE CHISHOLM MASSACRE: A 
PICTURE OF “HOME RULE” IN MISSISSIPPI (1877).  Race riots in 1906 followed a physical encounter 
between two black men and a conductor that left sixteen black men dead.  HEWITT CLARKE, BLOODY 
KEMPER: A TRUE STORY IN MIS’SIPPI (2nd ed. 1998).   
125 See, e.g., Jordan v. State, 32 Miss. 386 (1856). 
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made him particularly vulnerable, but as often simply observing that the defendant 
or a witness was a “negro.”126   
The Mississippi Supreme Court appears to have been uniquely vigilant in 
policing the interrogations of black suspects in interrogation rooms.  That court 
reversed over half of the confessions involving black defendants from the turn of the 
twentieth century, until the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Brown.127  No 
other appellate court in the Deep South appears to have had a reversal rate in 
confessions cases approaching this somewhat remarkable record, but this does not 
mean that they were abdicating the duty.  As Otis Stephens observed, appellate 
courts throughout the south were certainly reversing convictions involving African 
American defendants. 128  In a particular telling Alabama Supreme Court case, even 
though the court did not reverse, it showed particular concern about the facts of a 
case it heard.  In 1909, in Kelly v. State, the court held that the jury was justified in 
convicting the suspect and identified no problem with the method of interrogation 
that led to the defendant’s confession.  Even though the defendant, a black man who 
had been gambling on the night in question, was convicted of shooting someone the 
court identified as a very popular police officer in Talladega County.  While the 
court affirmed the conviction and the death sentence, the court also concluded that 
there were serious questions about the reliability of the confession and 
recommended that the governor consider the case for executive clemency.129  It is 
hard to argue that the United States Supreme Court felt it needed to gain supervision 
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over state appellate courts’ application of the existing legal doctrines.  Brown was 
an outrageous decision by a state appellate court, but very much an outlier, especially 
in Mississippi.  
The Supreme Court would, however, have had an interest in changing the 
doctrines these courts were applying.  A rule that did not admit a reliable but tortured 
confession would eliminate incentives to torture that were present in confessions 
rules used in state courts prior to Brown.  The Wickersham Commission brought 
police torture in interrogation rooms out of the shadows, and collected in one very 
public place the examples that had been previously discussed in state court opinions 
and newspaper reporting.  Brown cited Wickersham, therefore the court was 
intensely aware that police officers were willing to resort to torture.  A confessions 
rule premised on reliability gave interrogators an incentive to continue the regular 
use of abusive practices.  When the D.C. Court of Appeals in Ziang Sung Wan 
affirmed the admission of a corroborated coerced confession, the Supreme Court 
unanimously reversed, tersely but clearly stating that principles from the Fourth 
Amendment’s exclusionary rule animated the federal confessions rule.130   
Brown, though, had not expressly stated that coerced but corroborated 
confessions—or the physical evidence from coerced confessions—would not be 
admissible.  A decades-long debate about whether the Constitution was meant to 
ensure a confession’s reliability or deter improperly coercive interrogation tactics 
would therefore follow.  Two famous evidence scholars of the early twentieth 
century clearly staked out each perspective.  John Henry Wigmore, author of the 
first definitive evidence treatise and Northwestern Law School Dean, was no fan of 
keeping evidence from juries to give officers an incentive to obey the legal limits on 
investigations.  As Roger Roots has described, Wigmore “invested decades of effort 
into a personal war against the exclusionary rule,” going to the point of “misstat[ing], 
deliberately it would seem, the holding of some of the cases he cited” to support his 
claim that there was substantial judicial opposition to the rule.131  With Prohibition, 
judicial support for the rule increased substantially and immediately, something 
Wigmore described as “misplaced sentimentality” and the “heretical influence” of 
Boyd and Weeks.132 
Wigmore’s perspective on physical evidence mirrored his view on confessions, 
believing that reliability alone should govern the admissibility of evidence against a 
criminal defendant.  He even rejected the description of “voluntariness” for the 
confessions test.  Wigmore objected to the use of the term, “perceiving the inaptness 
of this term to voice a principle of trustworthiness.”133    
Charles T. McCormick, also an evidence scholar and Dean of the University of 
Texas School of Law, deemed the use of a deterrent basis for excluding evidence to 
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be far more compelling in cases of confessions than physical evidence.  While the 
United States Supreme Court had not begun to describe the Fourth Amendment’s 
exclusionary rule as a remedy needed to deter police misconduct, state courts and 
academic commentators had identified this justification for the rule.  Prohibition 
demonstrated the necessity of deterrence to state courts and for McCormick, the 
national disgrace of the third degree justified extending this rule to confession 
practices.  He observed that historically the rack and thumbscrew were seldom used 
because they had to be judicially authorized.  Early twentieth-century tortures he 
observed, were far more prevalent because they were committed in secret by officers 
subject to no oversight:  
 
Certainly the right to be immune in one’s person from the secret violence 
of police seems to be even more deserving of judicial protection than the 
constitutional immunity from searches and seizures.  The courts and the 
legislature have increasingly come to believe that a privilege to have the 
fruits of such a search or seizure suppressed as evidence, is needed as a 
discourager of the practice.  The reason for extending to the person from 
whom a confession has been wrung by torture, a similar privilege, whether 
the confession be true or false, is even stronger.134 
 
Both the McCormick and Wigmore perspectives gained acceptance in various 
opinions of the United States Supreme Court that followed Brown’s ambiguous 
holding.  As Otis Stephens thoroughly described his landmark work on the history 
of the Supreme Court’s regulation of interrogations, the Court in the 1940s and 
1950s sporadically introduced and subsequently rejected the idea that reliability was 
a basis for admitting a coerced confession.135  By 1961 however, in Rogers v. 
Richmond, after years of internal debate about whether reliability was a 
consideration in evaluating the admissibility of confessions, the Court articulated a 
deterrent justification for confessions modeled after the Fourth Amendment’s 
exclusionary rule that it had announced for federal cases in Ziang Sung Wan.136      
Brown certainly started the Court down a path that led to a confessions rule 
modeled on the Fourth Amendment’s exclusionary rule.  It is also fairly clear that 
this was the Court’s intent in Brown, despite its ambiguity and despite the Court’s 
internal debate about the role of reliability in confessions cases.  The context of the 
decision makes it hard to explain Brown as being driven by concerns about 
reliability, even though the suspects may well have been innocent.  If it were a case 
about accuracy, one would have expected the Supreme Court to mention the 
substantial reliability questions such an interrogation method would raise about a 
false confession, and state courts were already screening confessions for reliability 
(Brown itself notwithstanding).  Undeniably, however, Brown began a process by 
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which the Court frequently addressed the role reliability played in our acceptance of 
interrogation methods.  By 1961, the Court was willing to expressly state the 
conclusion that was practically inescapable from the authority offered in Ziang Sung 
Wan and the factual context of Brown, that the constitutional standard for the 
admissibility of a confession was “to be answered with complete disregard of 
whether or not [the suspect] in fact spoke the truth.”137  Rogers v. Richmond, decided 
the same year as Mapp v. Ohio, made it unmistakably clear that the Fourth 
Amendment’s guarantee against unreasonable searches and the Fifth Amendment’s 
confessions rule were to be applied to discourage police abuses even at the cost of 
the accuracy of the trial process.  For twenty-four states, the Fourth Amendment 
version was a new requirement; with only occasional deviations by the Court, it is 
hard to argue that the Fifth Amendment version was not well in place since Brown 
v. Mississippi. 
 
III. DETERRENT MODEL IN A WORLD OF DNA 
 
A federally monitored, deterrent-based confessions rule had implications likely 
unforeseeable to Supreme Court justices who had lived through the Prohibition Era’s 
legitimate fear of lawless police.  Abandoning reliability as a consideration under 
the Due Process Clause gave judges the ability to monitor confession practices to 
prevent coercion but not falsehood.  Prohibition shifted doctrines of criminal 
procedure from ensuring accuracy to deterring police misconduct.  In the context of 
seizures of physical evidence, this new way of viewing the rules of evidence 
benefitted guilty suspects; in the context of interrogations, it harmed innocent 
suspects.    
Shifting the justification for the voluntariness test from ensuring accuracy to 
preventing coercion would not, by itself, have risked a greater number of false 
confessions being heard by juries and courts.  When courts prior to Brown expressed 
concerns about a confession’s accuracy, it was the nature of the interrogation that 
gave them pause.138  Physical violence obviously raised such issues for courts, but 
so did a threat of some sort or a promise of leniency.139  Reliability was a one-way 
ratchet; a corroborated coerced confession could be rescued from exclusion.140  
DNA exonerations in the latter part of the twentieth century revealed something that 
startled many. Even in the absence of coercive tactics, suspects falsely confess.  Prior 
to these discoveries occasioned by advances in biological sciences, social scientists 
had no ability to study the circumstances that tend to prompt false confessions, and 
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139 See Green v. State, 15 S.E. 10 (Ga. 1891) (observing that there was “considerable conflict” 
in what sort of promise was sufficient to render a confession inadmissible). 
140 See Catherine Hancock, Due Process Before Miranda, 70 TUL. L. REV. 2195 (1996).   
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courts therefore lacked tools to protect accuracy with anything other than the proxy 
of coercion.   
This is not to say that the voluntariness rule, even after the Court concluded that 
it was not motivated by concerns of reliability, failed to address factors highly 
relevant to accuracy.  The Supreme Court’s evaluation of the voluntariness test 
following Brown looked at the suspect’s individual vulnerability, his intellectual and 
psychological sophistication, as well as experience with the police.  And regardless 
of a suspect’s individual characteristics, the length and hours of the interrogation, 
access to sleep and food, and the environment of the interrogation were part of the 
legal assessment.  Not surprisingly, studies have revealed that these factors are 
highly relevant in identifying false confessions.  The voluntariness test therefore 
continued to protect defendants from inaccuracy even as it denied the prosecution 
the benefit of a confession merely because it was accurate.   
The voluntariness test, however, came to be crushed under its own weight.  For 
three decades following Brown, the Supreme Court accepted dozens of confessions 
cases.141  As with any totality of the circumstances test, consistency is difficult to 
achieve.142  The decisions in confessions cases should have been providing guidance 
for lower courts.  The Supreme Court is an institution that establishes standards for 
lower courts to follow, not a court for the correction of errors.  The number of cases 
the Court was accepting in this area reveals its interest in setting policy, but the fact-
intensive nature of the questions presented by the cases prevented the creation of 
meaningful standards.  The rarity of fact-specific cases in other contexts illustrates 
the tension the Court felt between feeling a need to influence policy in this area and 
the inability to identify meaningful standards.  In the search and seizure context, by 
contrast, the Court in its history has taken very few cases considering whether, in 
the totality of the circumstances, probable cause existed.   
The Miranda decision was the Court’s answer to the administrability problem 
of the voluntariness rule but it had the effect of eliminating oversight of 
considerations informing accuracy.143  In one way, there was nothing new about the 
Miranda decision.  Two centuries ago, magistrates, who conducted interrogations 
until the mid-nineteenth century, were instructed to inform suspects of their right to 
silence during questioning, and as early as 1829, an American jurisdiction required 
magistrates to inform suspects of their right to counsel in these proceedings.144  
Decisions from the nineteenth century considered the fact that a suspect did not have 
counsel present during questioning as a factor that weighed against admissibility.145  
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Despite these long-existing historical antecedents however, the Miranda decision 
radically changed the law.  It not only attached new significance to the failure to 
provide warnings (a confession after Miranda could not be admitted without a 
warning and waiver), but the new rule had the practical effect of replacing the 
voluntariness test.   
Though Miranda itself claimed only to be creating a prophylactic rule to ensure 
that confessions were admissible, “[i]f warnings were delivered by the police and a 
waiver was given or signed, it is almost impossible to persuade a judge that the 
resultant confession is voluntary,” as Steven Duke has observed.146  Three justices, 
all at different points on the political spectrum, have drawn similar conclusions.  
Justice Souter has described a waiver of the rights of silence and counsel to be a 
“virtual ticket of admissibility” for a confession.147  Justice Thurgood Marshall 
observed that cases in which a defendant is able to “make a colorable claim that a 
self-incriminating statement was ‘compelled’ despite the fact that law enforcement 
adhered to the dictates of Miranda, are rare.”148  Chief Justice Rehnquist recognized 
that while “the requirement that Miranda warnings be given does not, of course, 
dispense with the voluntariness requirement,” he quoted Justice Marshall to 
conclude that a defendant would seldom be successful in demonstrating his 
confession was involuntary if he waived his rights to silence and counsel.149 
As judges and commentators have observed, in many ways Miranda fails in its 
civil libertarian goals.150  Justice White insightfully recognized in his dissent in 
Miranda that the same sort of custodial pressures apply when police seek a waiver 
during the interrogation itself.151  In each instance, the suspect is separated from 
society in a police-dominated environment.  Suspects who would have the heartiness 
to assert their Miranda rights in this setting are not likely to be the ones who would 
feel an interrogation’s coercive pressures most acutely.  Law and order critics of 
Miranda lament confessions that are lost because of the rule.  But there is a 
seemingly stronger civil libertarian concern.  The most vulnerable of suspects waive 
these protections.  Not only does Miranda not limit the coercive brunt of 
interrogations, it practically creates a presumption of admissibility for those very 
confessions that may be inaccurate. 
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For those rare times when a court considered the voluntariness of a confession 
after a waiver, the Supreme Court in Colorado v. Connelly concluded that concerns 
that the statement might be false would not provide a basis for exclusion.  This was 
a logical extension of Richmond’s rejection of reliability as a basis for the 
constitution’s confessions rule.  A mentally ill individual approached an officer in 
Connelly and, having heard voices, confessed to murder.  A version of the 
confessions rule that concerns itself with deterring police misconduct, not accuracy, 
has nothing to say about the admissibility of such a statement, as the Court ruled.  
The statement “might prove to be quite unreliable,” the Court held, “but this is a 
matter to be governed by the evidentiary laws of the forum . . . and not the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”152  
State and federal evidence codes, however, stack the deck in favor of 
admissibility.  Probative evidence is admissible—and certainly a suspect’s 
confession is probative—unless “substantially outweighed” by the risk of “unfair 
prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or 
needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.”153  A group of evidence scholars have 
argued persuasively that courts should rethink this highly deferential approach when 
there are concerns about the accuracy of a confession.154  Further, as Brandon Garrett 
has demonstrated, there is a real concern that interrogation techniques that are not 
“coercive,” as that term has been understood in the case law, will yield confessions 
that are not only false but have the appearance of reliability.155  If interrogators feed 
particularly vulnerable suspects details of a crime over an extended period of 
interrogation, the suspects will sometimes not only confess but do with a richness of 
detail that will leave a jury or reviewing court with little doubt of the suspect’s guilt.  
Certain types of interrogation practices that would not trigger coercion concerns 
have also been demonstrated to produce false confessions, especially for young or 
lower-functioning suspects who have been interrogated at length.156  Asking leading 
questions that assume incriminating facts and falsely informing a suspect that 
evidence points to his guilt risks a wrongful conviction, but does not create the sort 
of coercive atmosphere that Brown’s progeny condemns.157  By embracing a 
deterrent model for the limits on police interrogations, analogous to the one used for 
the regulation of the Fourth Amendment, the Court created a new vision of criminal 
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procedure that would later allow wrongful convictions to fall between the 
constitutional cracks.  
If the pretrial process does not screen out false confessions, then accuracy must 
be evaluated through the trial process.  It may not seem problematic to let a jury 
consider the value of a piece of evidence, but confessions are uniquely problematic.  
Juries attach particular weight to confessions; many jurors believe that such 
statements are necessarily accurate because a suspect would not falsely incriminate 
himself.158  Expert testimony can assist jurors in understanding the phenomenon of 
false confessions, though most courts have concluded that their possibility is not 
beyond the ken of average jurors.159  And courts generally do not permit an expert 
to opine on the accuracy of a particular confession.160  Under the pre-Miranda 
voluntariness test, or a version of the test modified to consider reliability-
undermining factors such as leading questioning or presenting the suspect with 
falsified evidence of his guilt, a judge presented with the issue may well find the 
confession sufficiently problematic to be inadmissible.  A jury considering this same 
confession, especially one without the benefit of expert testimony, may well find the 
defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.  At the same, however, Miranda 
requires a court to exclude a confession if a suspect was not given the opportunity 
to prevent the questioning from occurring in the first place. 
The Miranda scheme, which replaced the voluntariness test with a warning and 
waiver requirement, was intended to prevent coercion in interrogation rooms.  It can 
certainly be argued, as it was then argued by Justice White in dissent, that it fails to 
achieve even that goal.  But as reliability had been discarded as a goal of the 
constitutional regulation of confessions, the fear that false confessions might be 
overlooked was not even a consideration.  When squarely presented with a question 
about the admissibility of an unreliable confession obtained without coercion, or 
even interrogation, the Court in Connelly, writing in an era prior to DNA 
exonerations, concluded that reliability was not a constitutional concern.  Ziang 
Sung Wan, Brown, and their progeny had long since shifted the Court’s perspective 




Precedent allows our history to cast long shadows.  Prohibition understandably 
led courts to find a way to curb illegal searches that were causing widespread public 
outrage.  Preventing misconduct became more important than the accuracy of 
judicial proceedings, something critics of the exclusionary rule frequently decry.  
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One can imagine, however, that the interest in curbing an epidemic of unlawful 
searches outweighed society’s interest in successfully prosecuting every bootlegger.  
A broader principle was extracted from the Prohibition Era.  Constitutional criminal 
procedure provided a method of regulating other types of police misconduct.  In 
context, expansion of the exclusionary rule made sense.  Though examining the 
question more closely, it is likewise hard to quibble with a court denying police an 
incentive to torture a suspect, even if a guilty murder suspect is freed.  A narrow 
focus on the issue at hand, however, generated less-than-nuanced rules.  Prohibition 
gave us a new model for criminal procedure.  Deterrence replaced rather than 
supplemented accuracy in a world that understandably fixated on liquor searches 
and rampant torture.  DNA exonerations have revealed that there were unintended 
consequences to rejecting what had, prior to Prohibition, been the goal of criminal 
procedure—an accurate judicial process.  
 
 
